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Karl Popper (1902–1994) gave us falsificationism, a relatively simple but often misunderstood philosophical tool for demarcating between science and non-science. He laid down this methodology in his magnum opus, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959).
His aim was to confront the problem of induction, where only confirming instances tend to be noticed. Turning this on its head, Popper argued that a single contrary result should be enough to falsify a theory—provided the result is repeatable and the test genuinely bears on the claim.
To Popper, the terms testable, falsifiable, and scientific were closely linked. For a theory to count as scientific, it should make risky predictions and be vulnerable to being proven wrong. Popper criticized theories that leave too much ambiguity—where almost any outcome can be interpreted as “consistent.” Such theories do not add much to knowledge because they can always be saved.
A theory can be conclusively falsified, but never conclusively verified. As Popper put it: "Our knowledge can only be finite, while our ignorance must necessarily be infinite."
Science, according to Popper, proceeds by a process of “conjecture and refutation.” He promoted bold theories and noted that falsification is not necessarily a failure; it can mark genuine progress.
Popper also recognized problems with falsificationism. It is often possible to immunize a theory against falsification using ad-hoc hypotheses. Scientists are human, and can be reluctant to see cherished theories undermined. Anomalies may be ignored or minimized while the community still pays lip service to falsifiability. When that happens, the boundary between science and ideology becomes blurred.
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